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Abstract
In this paper we assess the stability of open economy backward
looking Phillips curves estimated over two diﬀerent exchange rate
regimes. The time-series we deal with come from the simulation of
a New-Keynesian hybrid model suited for performing monetary pol-
icy analysis. Our results conﬁrm Lindé (2001)’s ﬁnding on the low
power of the Chow (1960) test in small samples. However, we do not
ﬁnd strong statistical support for the quantitative relevance of the
Lucas critique when the ’true’ model of the economy is featured by a
positive but low degree of forwardness.
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1’Given that the structure of an econometric model consists of op-
timal decision rules of economic agents, and that optimal decision
rules vary systematically with changes in the structure of the se-
ries relevant to the decision makers, it follows that any change
in policy will systematically alter the structure of econometric
models.’ (Robert E. Lucas Jr., 1976, p.41)
’[The] question of whether a particular model is structural is
an empirical, not theoretical, one.’ (Robert E. Lucas Jr. and
Thomas J. Sargent, 1981, pp. 302-303).
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Since the publication of the seminal paper by Lucas (1976), many researchers
have undertaken eﬀorts toward the microfoundation of economic models to
be employed for performing policy analysis. Indeed, one of the ﬁelds that
has been intensely aﬀected by this push toward microfoundation is the mon-
etary one (see e.g. Rotemberg and Woodford 1997; McCallum and Nelson,
1999a,b). Nevertheless, a diﬀerent strand of this literature (e.g. Rudebusch
and Svensson 1999,2002; Ball 1999,2000) has focussed on ad-hoc backward
looking models, so following in spirit the VAR models popularized by Sims
(1980). Indeed, backward looking models are quite appreciable from at least
two diﬀerent but important viewpoints: They tend to oﬀer a quite good ﬁt
of the data, and their dynamics closely resemble those ﬁltered with struc-
tural VARs, an issue that pure forward looking models have some troubles
in dealing with (Estrella and Fuhrer, 2002).
Evidently enough, backward looking models are right the policy tools
criticized by Lucas (1976). Indeed, if agents are rational, reduced-form co-
eﬃcients (i.e. those of the backward looking models, if the ’true’ model is
featured by some degree of ’forwardness’) should in principle be quite un-
stable over diﬀerent policy regimes. But are they relevantly unstable over
diﬀerent regimes? After all, the relevance of the Lucas critique is funda-
mentally a quantitative issue (Lucas and Sargent, 1981). Then, a question
naturally arises: Is the Lucas critique quantitatively important when back-
ward looking monetary models are estimated and employed over diﬀerent
2monetary policy regimes?
Some recent studies based on U.S. data suggest a negative answer.1 Some-
what surprisingly, not that much attention has been posed yet to open-
economies, despite their growing importance in terms of exchanges in goods
and services and ﬁnancial tradings all over the world (see e.g. Lane 2001;
Sarno 2001). Then, in this paper we aim at proposing a ﬁrst evaluation of
the importance of the Lucas critique for open-economy policy models in the
context of the modern monetary policy literature.
To investigate this issue, we employ a hybrid open-economy model (i.e. a
convex combinations of forward and backward-looking schedules) to obtain
simulated time-series for variables such as inﬂation, output gap, real exchange
rate, and policy rates. In performing our simulations, we allow for a regime
shift resembling what historically happened in several open-economies, i.e.
the shift from a ’controlled’ nominal exchange rate volatility to a ﬂoating
exchange rate framework with the latter corresponding to a CPI inﬂation
targeting. Then, we employ these simulated time-series to estimate a back-
ward looking version of the possibly most important schedule in monetary
policy, i.e. the Phillips curve. We do so because of the discussion that has
been taking place for some years now on how to formalize the relationship
between inﬂation and the real side of the economy. In fact, while on the one
hand the expectations augmented New-Keynesian Phillips curve has become
the workhorse model of modern research in monetary policy (e.g. Clarida,
Galì, and Gertler 1999), on the other hand researchers such as Mankiw (2001)
and Estrella and Fuhrer (2002) have shown that this model is just at odds
with the facts. In particular, the failure of the New Keynesian Phillips curve
refers to its predictions concerning i) disinﬂationary booms caused by fully
credible disinﬂations, ii) a low-autocorrelated inﬂation rate, and iii) an imme-
diate and one-shot reaction to a monetary policy shock. To ﬁx this problem,
Estrella and Fuhrer (2002) suggest to go for hybrid/backward looking mod-
1See Rudebusch (2003) and Estrella and Fuhrer (2003). Notice that here we are refer-
ring to contributions that are very closely related to our object of investigation, i.e. the
empirical relevance of the Lucas critique for backward looking monetary policy models. In
general, the quantitative importance of the Lucas critique has been subject to wide atten-
tion since 1976. For surveys in this sense, see Favero and Hendry (1992) and Ericsson and
Irons (1995).
3els. Therefore, the attention we place on a backward looking Phillips curve
is - we believe - justiﬁed.
Basically, the ’simulation-and-estimation’ methodology we employ here is
that proposed by Taylor (19 8 9 ) .T a y l o rp o i n t st o w a r da na s s e s s m e n to ft h e
stability of several VAR-type schedules in an open-economy framework. By
implementing the above described strategy with an estimated open-economy
model, Taylor reaches the conclusion that the Lucas critique’s importance is
not quantitatively overwhelming.
Similarly to Taylor (1989)’s contribution, we consider a shift from a ’con-
trolled’ exchange rate regime to a ’ﬂoating’ one, shift whose importance is
evident in the light of both historical evidence and the discussion on the
choice of the optimal exchange rate regime (see e.g. Corden 2002). Contrar-
ily to Taylor (1989), we do allow for imperfect exchange rate pass-through
(so capturing the insights coming from Campa and Goldberg, 2002) and non-
standard exchange rate expectations’ formation (as suggested by Frankel and
Froot, 1987), in order to handle a credible model from the dynamics view-
point. More importantly, in our study we employ a statistical tool, i.e. the
Chow (1960) breakpoint test, to assess the stability of the estimated coeﬃ-
cients of our reduced-form Phillips curve.2
A note about the Chow test is needed. In fact, this is the test that most
of the researchers employ when assessing coeﬃcients’ instability. About this
point, in a recent contribution Lindé (2001) employs a monetary policy model
calibrated with U.S. data, simulates a regime-shift, and show that the Chow
(1960) test may indeed lead to wrong conclusions on the stability of estimated
coeﬃcients because of its low-power in small samples. Therefore, his claim
is that several researchers have found the Lucas critique not to be important
just because of their choice of relying on such a statistical tool. Aware of
Lindé (2001)’s warning, we perform our ’simulation and estimation’ exercise
with three diﬀerent sample-lengths, in order to not to be misguided by the
indications coming from the Chow test.
Our results conﬁrm Lindé (2001)’s ﬁnding on the low-power of the Chow
test in small samples. However, some qualiﬁcations are needed. In fact, ac-
2By contrast, Taylor (1989) just compares sub-sample estimates in a ’qualitative’ man-
ner.
4cording to the set-up at hand, the (in)stability of the estimated coeﬃcients
is connected to the ’degree of forwardness’ of the ’true’ model of the econ-
omy. In particular, if our regime shift occurs in an economy predominantly
backward looking, then the impact on the coeﬃcients of the reduced form
Phillips curve turns out to be negligible also in large samples. This seems to
be good news for the reliability of the monetary policy analyses performed
with open economy backward looking models, e.g. the assessment of diﬀerent
policy rules (e.g. Ball 1999,2000), or the evaluation of the sacriﬁce ratio (e.g.
Leitemo and Røste, 2003).
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present the small
macro model we employ to produce the simulated time-series of interest. In
Section 3 we oﬀer a very simple example to explain why a regime shift might
harm the stability of backward-looking models’ coeﬃcients. Section 4 con-
tains an explanation of the steps we implement to perform our econometric
exercise. In Section 5 we present our ﬁndings, whose robustness is discussed
in Section 6. Section 7 concludes, and References follow.
2 A simple open-economy macro-model
We present here the ’true’ model we employ for performing our numerical
simulations. In our open-economy framework, the Phillips curve and the IS
schedule deﬁning the paths of the domestic inﬂation rate and the output gap
read as follows:
πt+1 = µπEtπt+2 +( 1− µπ)πt + αyyt + αqEtqt+1 + ut+1 (1)
yt+1 = µyEtyt+2 +( 1− µy)yt − βr(it − Etπt+1)+βqqt + βyy
∗
t + vt+1 (2)
where πt is the annualized quarterly inﬂation, yt is the output gap (i.e. the
log-diﬀerence between the real GDP and a measure of potential output), qt
is the real exchange rate, it is the short-term nominal interest rate controlled
by the Central Bank, ut and vt are iid processes with zero mean and standard
deviations σu and σv,a n dy∗
t is the foreign output gap (as, in general, starred
variables refer to foreign variables).
5Equations (1) and (2) are fairly in line with those in Svensson (2000)
and Leitemo and Söderström (2003).3 In particular, equation (1) determines
the domestic inﬂation rate as a function of the expected inﬂation rate, the
lagged one, and the lagged values of the output gap and the real exchange
rate. This is an open economy version of a hybrid Phillips curve, in which
the inﬂation rate is pre-determined one period, it is endogenously inertial
(due to e.g. wage contracting as in Fuhrer and Moore, 1995, or to indexation
of those prices that are not re-optimized in a given period, as in Christiano
et al, 2003, and in Smets and Wouters, 2003), and it also takes into account
the eﬀect of expected costs of imported intermediate inputs.4 The ’cost
push shock’ ut+1 is justiﬁed by the time-varying markup of monopolistically
competitive ﬁrms, as in Smets and Wouters (2003). Equation (2) deﬁnes the
path of the output gap, which is caused by expectations on future output
gap’s realizations as well as past values (the latter ﬁnding its rationale in
e.g. habit formation, as in Fuhrer 2000), the ex-ante real interest rate, the
real exchange rate, which proxies the increased demand for domestic goods
driven by exchange rate depreciation, and the foreign output gap, which
captures the increased demand for domestic goods due to the booming foreign
economy. The stochastic component of the aggregate demand curve, i.e.
vt+1, may be interpreted as a preference shock (Smets and Wouters, 2003).5
Notice that equations (1) and (2) allows for explicit lags in the transmission
mechanism; in fact, it is hard to derive these lags from microfoundations,
but they are quite useful to match the apparent gradual response of inﬂation
and output to monetary policy shocks. Indeed, the introduction of these lags
exert a signiﬁcan quantitative impact on the monetary policy transmission
3Svensson (2000) shows that equations similar to (1)a n d( 2 )i nt h et e x tm a yb ed e r i v e d
from ﬁrst principles. However, we do not want to push this point here, given that we are
just interested in having a model producing plausible simulated patterns of the time-series
of interest. In other words, the model we present here has to be interpreted as the structural
one, and its parameters are constant across regimes.
4In our model an increase of the nominal/real exchange rate stands for depreciation.
5Note that the steady state value of the real exchange rate qt in this model is equal to
zero, hence the model is consistent with the natural rate hypothesis. The lagged impact
of the real exchange rate on the domestic output gap is due to our willingness of avoiding
the contemporaneous presence of the current and the expected domestic policy rate in the
IS equation, which would render the regulator problem non-standard.
6mechanism, as shown by Dennis and Söderström (2002).
The nominal exchange rate st is a key-element in our analysis. In our
model, its temporal evolution is driven by the following hybrid stochastic
version of the uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition:
it = i
∗
t + µsEtst+1 +( 1− µs)st−1 − st + ϕt (3)
where the risk-premium ϕt follows an AR(1) process with root ρψ and
a zero-mean stochastic error ψt whose standard deviation is equal to σψ.6
Clearly, when µs =1 , eq. (3) is a standard stochastic UIP condition. How-
ever, there is a certain evidence of backward-lookingness in the exchange rate
expectations’ formation (e.g. Frankel and Froot, 1987).7 We model this pos-
sibility by allowing for the lagged nominal exchange rate st−1 to play an active
role in the exchange rate determination; this happens when 0 ≤ µs < 1.N o -
tice that when µs =0the UIP equation (3) assumes the backward looking
ﬂavor that Debelle and Wilkinson (2002) attribute to it.
As indicated above, one of the arguments (potentially) of interest for the
central banker is the CPI inﬂation rate πCPI
t , which is deﬁned as
π
CPI
t =( 1− χ)πt + χπ
M
t (4)
where χ is the weight of imported goods in the aggregate consumption
basket, and πM
t stands for imported inﬂation. Following Leitemo and Söder-








t + st) (5)
Importantly, the parameter θ allows for the possibility of deviating from
the law of one price in the short-run. In fact, if 0 ≤ θ < 1, then the imported
price level does not immediately fully adjust after that a shock has hit the
foreign inﬂation rate or the nominal exchange rate. This price stickiness
6We shape the stochastic component ϕt as an AR(1) process mainly to capture the
commonly observed persistence of the risk-premium, as in McCallum and Nelson (1999b),
Svensson (2000), and Leitemo and Söderström (2003).
7Frankel and Froot (1987) concentrate on three departures from rational expectations,
i.e. distributed lags, adaptive expectations, and regressive expectations; in their paper, all
these three models turn out to be supported by the data.
7is intended to capture the imperfection of the exchange rate pass-through
observed in the real world, imperfection that tend to be much less important
in the long run, as shown in Campa and Goldberg (2002).8 The strategy
of modelling price stickiness and not pricing-to-market is also followed by
Smets and Wouters (2002) and Lindé et al (2003).
Since the real exchange rate qt is deﬁned as
qt = st + p
∗
t − pt (6)
equations (4), (5), and (6) suggest the following link between real ex-
change rate and CPI inﬂation:
π
CPI
t =( 1− χ)πt + χ[(1 − θ)π
M
t−1 + θ(πt + ∆qt)] (7)
which makes it clear that (the change of) the real exchange rate exerts
an impact over CPI inﬂation. As far as the Rest-Of-the-World (ROW hence-
forth) is concerned, our formalization follows the one proposed by Svensson
(2000). In particular, we assume that ROW follows a Taylor rule, i.e.
i
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y are the coeﬃcients respectively associated to foreign
inﬂation and foreign output gap, ρi∗ is the interest rate smoothing coeﬃcient,
while ζ
∗
t is a zero-mean white noise process with variance σ∗
ζ.T oc a t c ht h e
persistence typically observed in macro data, π∗
t and y∗


























8Campa and Goldberg (2002) investigate exchange rate pass-through short-run and
long-run elasticities on a sample of 25 OECD countries for the period 1975-1999. It turns
out that in the short-run the law of one price is rejected in 22 out of 25 cases, but in the
long-run 16 cases out of 25 support an elasticity statistically equivalent to one.
82.1 Optimal monetary policy
The monetary authorities’ behavior closes the model. In our framework, the
Central Banker controls the short-term nominal interest rate it,a n da i m s
at minimizing the volatility of the arguments belonging to his loss function.
Of course, diﬀerent monetary policy regimes go hand-in-hand with diﬀer-
ent penalty function. The following generic loss function captures the two
diﬀerent regimes we will analyze in our exercise:9




In particular, the weights {λ∆s,λπCPI,λy} are structural parameters of
our framework, i.e. the preferences of the Central Banker over the targeted
arguments (Svensson, 1999), and identify the regimes we will work with;
by contrast, the interest rate smoothing argument Va r(∆it) is mainly intro-
duced to avoid counterfactual extreme ﬂuctuations of the short-term nominal
interest rate.10
The loss function (11) deserves some explanations. As already mentioned,
we aim at mimicking a shift from a ’limited ﬂexibility’ nominal exchange rate
regime to a ﬂexible one characterized by CPI inﬂation targeting, a shift that
concerned a certain number of countries in the past decades (Reinhart and
Rogoﬀ, 2002); a few examples are collected in Table 1.11
[Table 1 about here]












,w h e r exi is one of the n arguments targeted by the monetary
authorities. As shown by Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), the conditional expectation
presented here tends to the unconditional expectation discussed in the text for δ * 1.I n
this study, we ﬁx the discount factor δ to be equal to .99, a standard choice given the
quarterly frequency assumed for our model.
10In performing our simulations, we will consider for the interest rate smoothing argu-
ment a relative weight =0 .2, as in Rudebusch and Svensson (2002).
11Notice that in most of the selected cases Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2002) do not ﬁnd
evidence of a ﬁxed exchange rate regime; this is why we analyze a form of ’controlled’
exchange rate volatility.
9Then, our strategy is that of simulating the ’controlled’ nominal exchange
rate regime by implementing the following targeting strategy:12
E(Lt)=λ∆sVa r(∆st)+λ∆iVa r(∆it) (12)
This is a targeting of the stationary diﬀerence existing between today’s
and yesterday’s nominal exchange rate. Given the equation involving the real
exchange rate (6) and the UIP (3), this calls for an optimal policy rule that
takes into account both domestic elements and, above all, foreign variables
such as the foreign policy rate and the risk-premium. In this sense, we believe
our approximation of a controlled exchange rate regime may be considered as
being fairly satisfactory.13 B yc o n t r a s t ,a f t e rt h er e g i m es h i f tt h em o n e t a r y




t )+λyVa r(yt)+λ∆iVa r(∆it) (13)
2.2 A note on the solution of the Central Banker’s
problem
In computing the solution of the Central Banker’s problem, we assume that
the central banker is conducting monetary policy under discretion. Indeed,
this assumption seems to be quite reasonable for describing the inﬂation
targeting framework widely adopted all over the world by many central banks
for some time now (Bernanke and Mishkin, 1997). It is possible to show that
12To mimic the ﬁrst regime, one might think of setting a policy rule like it = i∗
t +ϕt,i n
order to ’exploit’ the UIP and stabilize the nominal exchange rate. However, this strategy
w o u l dl e a dt oex-post instability of the exchange rate as well as indeterminacy, as shown
by Benigno, Benigno, and Ghironi (2003).
13A discussion on possible alternative ways of shaping a ’controlled’ exchange rate regime
is oﬀered in the Appendix of this paper available upon request.
14Notice that in this work we are considering monetary policy shifts that are intimately
related to the open economy dimension of the model. In other words, in a closed economy
set up the targeting schemes we discuss in the text are just not replicable. Then, we are
not claiming that a regime shift having no consequences on the estimated reduced-form
coeﬃc i e n t si nac l o s e de c o n o m ys e t - u pm i g h ti n d e e dh a v ea ni m p a c tw h e nw eo p e nu pt h e
economy. Indeed, this might be an interesting issue for further research.
10the solution of the monetary authorities’ problem in this context is given by
the following feedback rule:15
it = fx1t (14)
where f is a (1x9) vector whose elements are complicated convolutions of
the policymakers’ preferences and the parameters of the economy, while x1t
is the (9x1) vector of the pre-determined variables of the problem, i.e. x1t
=
h






. This endogenous targeting
rule closes the model.
Our model (1)-(10) and (14) is quite ﬂexible, and it can be easily forced
to assume a pure forward looking fashion (i.e. µπ = µy = µs =1 )o ra
pure backward looking structure (i.e. µπ = µy = µs =0 ). We think of
it as representing a fair compromise between highly stylized formalizations
of the open economy framework (e.g. Ball, 1999,2000) and more complex,
fully-ﬂedged ones (e.g. Smets and Wouters, 2002). Although not fully in line
with representations whose beauty is due to theoretical coherence coming
from microfoundation (e.g. Galì and Monacelli, 2003), this model is actually
quite close to one of them, i.e. Lindé, Nessén, and Söderström (2003).
2.3 Model parametrization
The benchmark parametrization used in our exercise is largely borrowed from
the existing literature dealing with dynamic stochastic monetary modeling.
In fact, we make no attempt of estimating the model; instead, we select
plausible parameters values in order to provide a ﬁr s ta s s e s s m e n to nw h a ti t
might be the relevance of the Lucas critique in an open-economy environment.
In particular, the domestic economy is almost fully parametrized on the
basis on Leitemo and Söderström (2003)’s paper.16 As far as the degree of
forwardness of the UIP condition is concerned, we set µs = .7, i.e. slightly
larger than the degree of forwardness of the Phillips curve µπ = .5 and
15See Söderlind (1999) for details, also present in the Appendix of the paper available
upon request.
16Since Leitemo and Söderström (2003) work with a quarterly inﬂation rate, while we
work with a four-quarter inﬂation rate, we re-scaled their Phillips curve coeﬃcients by
multiplying them by 4.
11that of the IS equation µy = .3;w em a k et h i sc h o i c et or e c o g n i z et ot h e
nominal exchange rate its feature of ’forward looking determined asset price’
(Svensson, 2000). Moreover, we set the exchange rate pass-through coeﬃcient
θ = .5, in line with many of the point estimates in Campa and Goldberg
(2002). The foreign economy is parametrized as in Svensson (2000); as a sole
exception, we enriched the ROW Taylor rule with the interest rate smoothing
parameter ρi∗ = .75, pretty much in line with the value estimated by Clarida,
Galì, and Gertler (2000) for the US. All the parameters of the benchmark
model are collected in Table 2. Finally, the ’controlled nominal exchange
rate volatility’ regime (Loss function [12]) is featured by λ∆s =1 ,λ∆i = .2;
by contrast, the ’CPI Quasi-Strict Inﬂation Targeting’ regime (Loss function
[13]) is characterized by λπCPI =1 ,λy = .5,λ∆i = .2.
The models is thought for ’replicating’ quarterly dynamics. All the vari-
ables are in log-deviations with respect to their steady states, which are
normalized to zero. The timing of the model goes as follows: at the begin-
ning of the tth-period, shocks strike the economy; then, private agents form
their expectations; ﬁnally, CB sets the policy rate. As testiﬁed by its impulse
response functions, the model is quite appealing from an empirical viewpoint,
i.e. it is a tool capable to produce sensible dynamics. Given the similarity be-
tween our impulse response functions and those reported in Svensson (2000)
and Leitemo and Söderström (2003), we refer to those contributions for a
detailed comment, just adding that - as expected - the reaction of the real
exchange rate to all the shocks considered in our simulations is milder under
the ’controlled’ nominal exchange rate regime.
[Figures 1-2 about here]
Table 3 collects the coeﬃcients of the optimal rules (14) conditional to
the regime shift described above and the model parameters as in Table 2. As
expected, huge diﬀerences exist between optimal rules associated to diﬀerent
targeting schemes. In particular, the Central Banker attributes a large im-
portance to the elements entering the UIP condition in the Pre-Shift phase,
and mainly to domestic elements in the Post-Shift period. Notably, the shift
also leads to a higher optimal interest rate smoothing, given the higher con-
c e r nt o w a r di n ﬂation stabilization under discretion (Woodford, 2003).
12[Tables 2-3 about here]
3W h y m a y t h e L u c a s c r i t i q u e a ﬀect back-
ward looking models?
Before moving to the description of our exercise, we present a simple example
to explain why the Lucas critique may aﬀect reduced-form backward-looking




yt+j + εt (15)
yt = φyt−1 + vt (16)
where xt is the variable targeted by the policy makers, yt is the policy
variable, εt and vt are white noise exogenous shocks, and 0 < φ < 1.I nt h i s
model, agents form expectations on the future path of the policy variable
yt; the equilibrium value of the target-variable xt is right a function of these
expectations. By plugging (16) into (15) and imposing rational expectations,
we obtain the following equation:
xt = γyt + εt (17)
where γ ≡ θ
1−φ. Then, if the econometrician estimates γ in (17) and
use this model to perform policy simulations based on alternative policies
{yt+j}
∞
j=0 (which is to say, based on alternative values of φ), he will miss
the link existing between new policies {yt+j}
∞
j=0 and the corresponding new
values for γ.
As stressed by Lucas and Sargent (1981), while the theoretical point
raised by Lucas (1974) is out of discussion, its empirical importance must be
quantitatively evaluated; indeed, this assessment is the goal of our exercise.





(γπiπt−i + γyiyt−i + γqiqt−i)+ξ
π
t (18)
13Eq. (18) embeds all and no more than the variables present in the ’struc-
tural’ Phillips curve (1), and it is intended to capture it in a backward looking
fashion.17 In fact, it is nothing but an open-economy version of the one pro-
posed by Rudebusch and Svensson (1999,2002) for the US. Notably, with
adequate restrictions on the coeﬃcients γs, this reduced-form equation col-
lapses to the one by Ball (1999, 2000).18
Then, is eq. (18) stable across the two diﬀerent regimes (12) and (13)?
In the next Section we investigate this issue.19
4 Steps for assessing the statistical relevance
of the Critique
Our algorithm to assess the importance of the Lucas critique goes as follows:
1. We simulate the Data Generating Process of the economy for I + T
periods under the null of absence of regime shifts.I n d o i n g s o , w e
draw I +T times from a zero-mean normal distribution per each shock




t,s h o c k sw h o s ev a r i a n c e s
are indicated in Table 2. Notice that the ﬁrst I =1 0 0periods are
simulated in order to obtain a stochastic vector of initial values for the
model, and are just discarded before implementing Step 2.
2. With the whole sample of simulated data (sample whose size is equal
to T), we OLS estimate the ’reduced form’ coeﬃcients of the backward
looking Phillips curve (18). Then, we compute the F-statistical value
17Of course, it would be interesting to write (and estimate) the exact reduced form
of the structural inﬂation equation (1). Unfortunately, given the somewhat complicated
structure of the economic model at hand, this is far from being an easy task. Moreover,
that of estimating a reduced form Phillips curve whose coeﬃcients are complicated (and
unknown) convolutions of the structural parameters of the economy is nothing but what
an econometrician working with backward looking models typically does.
18Ball (19 9 9 , 2 0 0 0 ) ’ sP h i l l i p sc u r v er e a d sa sf o l l o w s :πt = πt−1+αyt−1−γ(qt−1−qt−2)+η.
To be precise, in those papers yt stands for the log of real output.
19Notice that, given the ﬂexibility of the model at hand, it would be quite easy to
simulate several other regime shifts, e.g. CPI vs. domestic inﬂation targeting, strict vs.
ﬂexible inﬂation targeting, and so on. We leave these exercises for future research.
14related to the Chow (1960) breakpoint test. To do that, we consider
subsamples of equal size T1 = T2 = T
2.20 Notice that here we are
applying the Chow test to detect the break occurring at a known date,
g i v e nt h a tw ep e r f e c t l yk n o wt h ed a t eo ft h eb r e a k . 21 We perform our
exercise with samples features by diﬀerent sizes: a ’small’ one (T =
200), an ’intermediate’ one (T = 500), and a ’large’ one (T =1 ,000).22
We do this in order not to obtain misleading indications from the Chow-
test, whose power is low in small samples (Lindé, 2001);
3. We repeat Steps 1-2 N =5 ,000 times. Once done so, we compute the F-
critical value for the Chow test, so obtaining the corrected-per-sample-
size critical value of the test (we go for a 5% statistical conﬁdence);
4. We implement Step 1 allowing for the above described regime-shift at
t = T
2;23
5. We implement Step 2. Once done so, we compare the F-statistical
value with the F-critical value computed in Step 3. Notice that if
the statistical value is larger/smaller than the critical one, the null of
stability is rejected/non rejected;
6. We repeat Steps 4-6 N =5 ,000 times. Then, we count how many
times we rejected the null of stability (in Step 5). This rejection rate
is a ’p-value’ indicating the probability of rejecting the null of stabil-
ity of the estimated backward looking Phillips curve at a 5% level of
statistical conﬁdence. If this rejection-rate is larger/smaller than .05,
























∼ F(k,T − 2k) under the null of stability.
21For a note on the Chow test vs. alternative ones when the break-date is unknown see
Hansen (2001).
22Of course, our labelling is not to be taken too seriously, given that a sample of 200
quarterly observations is frankly quite large in the real world.
23Notice that in moving from the ﬁrst regime to the second one we are assuming that
agents are not concerned with any learning issue; this is a limitation of our approach, and
probably renders our ’in-lab’ exercise less close to reality than a study performed on actual
data. On the other hand, this approach amplify the power of the Chow test, so rendering
its suggestions (above all those coming from large samples) more reliable.
15then the estimated backward looking schedules should be judged as be-
ing potentially unstable/stable, and the Lucas critique turns out to be
empirically relevant/non-relevant. This is so because, if the Null holds
true, just a 5% should show up (due to the level of conﬁdence we se-
lected). Then, a higher value would signal that the Null is statistically
rejected.24
In performing our exercise we consider diﬀerent parametrizations of our
’true’ model of the economy. In particular, we take into account all the combi-
nations of these batteries of forward looking degrees: (µπ,µ y)={(.3,.1),(.5,.3),(.8,.8)},
µs = {.4,.7,.9}.T h eﬁrst battery is that employed by Rudebusch (2003) in
his study on the Lucas critique, while the second one is intended to explore
the consequence of having diﬀerent degrees of forward lookingness in the UIP
condition (3). We now turn to the analysis of our results.
5F i n d i n g s
Our results are collected in Table 4.25 This Table displays the ’p-values’
(i.e. rejection-rates) computed as explained in the previous section.26 Some
interesting results seem to come out. First, as long as the ’true’ model of the
economy is featured by low degrees of forwardness of the AD-AS schedules,
the estimated Phillips curve shows a quite appreciable stability. In particular,
when we consider the pair (µπ,µ y)=( .3,.1) it is hard to detect a strong
evidence of instability. In fact, the highest ’rejection rate’ in this case is .151
(for T =1 ,000), i.e. a ﬁgure far from being overwhelmingly in favour of a
24Since we are working with an empirical F-distribution, standard deviations for the
computed rejection-rates should also be taken into account. However, the standard devia-
tion is equal to
rej.rate(1−rej.rate) √
N , i.e. the maximum value it can assume is .003536 (when
the rejection-rate = .5). In claiming that an estimated equation is non-stable, we will
consider large rejection-rates so to take into account the uncertainty surrounding them.
25In order to save space, we do not present in the paper the volatilities of the main
economic variables computed under the various regimes and models considered in our





of the estimated equations ranges from a maximum of .774 (registered in the
sample T =1 ,000 for the model (µπ,µ y,µ s)=( .3,.1,.9) to a minimum of .155 (T =2 0 0 ,
(µπ,µ y,µ s)=( .8,.8,.9)).
16rejection of the null of stability. Things change in favour of a more signiﬁcant
rejection of the hypothesis of coeﬃcients’ stability when we move toward more
forward looking models, even if for the triple (µπ,µ y,µ s)=( .5,.3,.7) we still
get a quite low rejection rate, i.e. .128 (for T =1 ,000). In fact, the estimated
curve (18) turns out to be clearly unstable only when pretty large degrees of
forwardness are taken into account. Interestingly, those high values are not
necessarily the most interesting ones, at least given what some contributions
on the US teach us about those parameters.27
The exercise we run allows us to reach also another conclusion regard-
ing the power of the test we employed. When we consider low degrees of
forwardness, the Chow test suggests rejection of the null of stability neither
when the small sample is employed nor when the intermediate one is taken
into account, and it signals instability only in one case out of three when the
large sample is considered. In fact, it is pretty hard to detect any diﬀerence
in the computed ’rejection rates’. For intermediate values of µπ and µy,t h e
diﬀerence is much more evident, above all when moving from the intermedi-
ate sample to the large one. Still, it seems to us that the Chow test is not
really suggesting a deﬁnitive rejection, at least in one case out of three. This
is interesting, given the marked emphasis that hybrid and backward look-
ing models have recently been given by leading researchers in this ﬁeld (e.g.
Estrella and Fuhrer 2002; Rudebusch 2003; Fuhrer and Rudebusch 2003).
Finally, the Chow test robustly rejects the null of stability just when the
’structural’ model of the economy is prominently forward looking. Wrapping
up, if we think of T =1 ,000 observations as forming a large sample, our
results line up with Lindè (2001)’s on the unreliability of the Chow test in
small samples, but do not oﬀer a robust support to the statistical relevance
of the Lucas critique when backward looking models are employed for per-
forming monetary policy analysis as long as the ’true’ model of the economy
is characterized by a large degree of endogenous persistence.
[Table 4 about here]
27See e.g. Fuhrer (1997) for the Phillips curve, and Fuhrer and Rudebusch (2003) for the
IS equation. However, there is a hot debate about the value of the ’degree of forwardness’
of the Phillips curve. For a small survey, see Rudebusch (2002b).
176 Robustness checks
Of course, our qualitative ﬁndings may be aﬀe c t e db ys o m eo ft h ec h o i c e s
we made when setting up the ’true’ model of the economy, when deciding
which reduced form to estimate, and so on. Accordingly, we performed some
checks to verify the robustness of our results. First, we replicated all the
simulations/estimations previously presented with a lower weight for the ’CPI
Quasi-Strict Inﬂation Targeting’ regime, i.e. we took into account a value for
λy = .2. Another check we performed was that of estimating a richer version
of equation (18). In particular, we added four lags of both the domestic and
the foreign short-term interest rate. Finally, we implemented a grid-check
having as protagonists key-parameters, such as αy (linking the output gap to
the inﬂation rate in the Phillips curve 1), βr (interest rate sensitivity of the
economy), and θ (indicating the degree ’imperfection’ of the exchange rate
pass-through); all in all, the results commented above turn out to be fairly
robust to these perturbations.28
7 Conclusions
We set up a small scale open economy dynamic stochastic model that allows
for imperfect exchange rate pass-through and endogenous persistence in inﬂa-
tion, output gap, and nominal exchange rate. With this model, we simulated
a regime shift, i.e. from ’controlled’ to ﬂoating exchange rate. With our sim-
ulated data, we estimated a reduced-form equation, i.e. a backward looking
Phillips curve, in order to evaluate its stability under such a regime shift.
With this ’simulation-and-estimation’ approach, we obtained some interest-
ing results. i) Overall, our results do not support the statistical importance
of the Lucas critique for this formulation of the Phillips curve, at least when
we do not assume large ’degrees of forwardness’ for our ’true’ model of the
economy. This is good-news for policy analysis based on backward-looking
models, above all when ’milder’ policy shifts - like fairly small variations of
28Values investigated (single departures with respect to the benchmark model): αy ∈
{.15,.2,.25}, βr ∈ {.1,.15,.2}, θ ∈ {0,.2,.4,.6,.8,1}. For sake of brevity, we do not display
here the results of our robustness checks. However, the Matlab codes for replicating them
are available upon request.
18aT a y l o rr u l e ’ sc o e ﬃcients - are taken into account (as in Ball 1999,2000), or
for assessments such that of the sacriﬁce ratio (as in e.g. Leitemo and Røste,
2003). ii) The more forward the ’true’ model of the economy is, the higher
is the probability of rejecting the null of stability of the estimated Phillips
curve. This ﬁnding calls for a serious quantiﬁcation of these key-parameters.
iii) Our analysis conﬁrms Lindé (2001)’s evidence against the power of the
Chow-breakpoint test in small samples. iv) The impact of diﬀerent processes
for the nominal exchange rate formation is not clear, and deserves further
investigation.
Of course, the ﬂi p - c o i no fo u rﬁndings leads us to state that if the ’true’
model of the economy is prevalently characterized by forward-looking agents,
then backward-looking models might turn out to be severely unstable. Un-
fortunately, nothing guarantees that forward looking models would show a
superior stability, as shown by Estrella and Fuhrer (2003). Therefore, we
interpret the evidence in this and other papers on the Lucas critique as a call
for monetary policy analyses based on a large variety of diﬀerent models, an
exercise already undertaken in some occasions, e.g. the NBER conference on
Taylor rules whose contributions are collected in Taylor (1999).
Notice that the results reached in our study are strictly related to the
magnitude of the shifts we considered. In fact, tougher shifts might lead to
diﬀerent conclusions on the stability of the Phillips curve. We think of this as
being a possible extension of this work. Other extensions also come as natu-
ral. First, the Phillips curve is not the only protagonist of the monetary pol-
icy transmission mechanism; then, the stability of other schedules is equally
important for a complete assessment of backward looking models. Then, an
analysis country-by-country on the importance of the Lucas critique should
be performed. This would imply the estimation of the structural model e.g.
via ML/Bayesian methods, as in Ireland (2001,2004) or Smets and Wouters
(2002), and would allow us to draw idiosyncratic conclusions concerning the
stability of the estimated reduced form equations in a given country. Finally,
the stability of more ﬂexible models having time-varying parameters could
be assessed. This line of research has already been followed by Cogley and
Sargent (2003) and Primiceri (2003), and promises to be quite fruitful.
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Table 1: HISTORICAL EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES SHIFTS.
Source: Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2002). The labels for the exchange rate regimes
are those referring to Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2002)’s coarse grid (Table 4 in
their paper), and go (from ’ﬁxed’ to ’ﬂoating’) approximately like this: ’peg’,
’crawling peg’, ’moving band’, ’managed ﬂoating’, ’freely ﬂoating’. Our cut-
oﬀ for shifting from ’controlled’ to ’ﬂoating’ exchange rate regime is located















































































































































Figure 1: IMPULSE RESPONSE FUNCTIONS UNDER CON-
T R O L L E DE X C H A N G ER A T EV O L A T I L I T Y .Strictly positive















































































































































Figure 2: IMPULSE RESPONSE FUNCTIONS UNDER QUASI-
STRICT CPI INFLATION TARGETING. Strictly positive weights in
the Loss function: λπCPI =1 ,λy = .5,λ∆i = .2.
26Domestic economy
Phillips curve IS curve UIP condition CPI equation
µπ .5 µy .3 µs .7 χ .35
αy .2 βr .15 ρϕ .3 θ .5
αq .04 βq .05 σ2
ψ .844
σ2
u 1.556 βy .12
σ2
v .656
Foreign economy Central Bank
Phillips curve IS curve Taylor rule Key-parameters
ρπ∗ .8 ρy∗ .8 fπ∗ 1.5 δ .99
σ2
u∗ .5 σ2




Table 2: BENCHMARK PARAMETRIZATION. Sources of the pa-
rameters indicated in the text.





Pre− Shift .27 .22 .85 -.06 .00 1.00 -.10- . 0 1 .06
Post− Shift .41 .65 .23 .01 .04 .53 .22 .11 .34
Table 3: OPTIMAL REACTION FUNCTIONS UNDER ALTER-
NATIVE REGIMES. Model parameter as in the benchmark case, see
Table 2.








.3 .1 .4 .054 .079 .151
.3 .1 .7 .052 .060 .077
.3 .1 .9 .049 .060 .059
.5 .3 .4 .112. 181 .576
.5 .3 .7 .076 .109 .220
.5 .3 .9 .062 .077 .128
.8 .8 .4 .332 .861 .998
.8 .8 .7 .408 .917. 9 9 9
.8 .8 .9 .424 .932 1.000
Table 4: ESTIMATED BACKWARD-LOOKING PHILLIPS
C U R V EI NP R E S E N C EO FAR E G I M ES H I F T .Note: ’rej. rate’ in-
dicates the probability of rejecting the Null of stability of the estimated equa-
tion at the 5-percent signiﬁcance level on the basis of the Chow-breakpoint
test. The Chow test 5-percent critical values were computed with a Monte-
carlo experiment under the Null of absence of structural break. Number of
lags = 4, interest rate smoothing weight = .2, number of sample draws N =
5,000, simulations run with the parameter values indicated in Table 2.
28